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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brandon Neil Crump appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 
methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing, contending the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Crump with trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing 
and felony injury to child. (R., pp.83-84.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crump pied 
guilty to a reduced charge of trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted 
manufacturing. (9/19/2011 Tr., p.9, L.5-p.12, L.15; R., pp.90-91,102.) Pursuant to the 
negotiations, the state agreed to dismiss the injury to child charge and "limit its 
recommendation to 4 years max: 2 years fixed + 2 indeterminate." (9/19/2011 Tr., p.12, 
L.22 - p.15, L.3; R., p.103.) The district court accepted Grump's plea to count one of 
the amended information, dismissed the injury to child charge with prejudice, released 
Crump from custody as part of the negotiated deal, ordered a presentence investigation 
report, and set the matter for sentencing. (9/19/2011 Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.19, L.25.) 
Crump filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing (R., p.130), 
asserting in an accompanying memorandum in support of his motion that he was never 
advised of his right to challenge the search warrant in his case and as such he should 
be allowed to withdraw his plea (R., p.133-135). Although Grump's original 
memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw his plea acknowledged Crump "pied 
guilty to a serious felony charge with a mandatory minimum sentence" (R., p.135), he 
filed a supplemental motion to withdraw his plea asserting the plea agreement between 
1 
himself and the state "create[d] the illusion that the court [was] not required by the plea 
to enter a 2 year term with a mandatory 2 year sentence" (R., p.149). 
Following a hearing on the motion to withdraw Grump's guilty plea where the only 
issue addressed was Grump's assertion that he was not properly advised there was a 
mandatory minimum two year sentence associated with the amended charge he was 
pleading guilty to, the district court denied the motion, finding: 
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a 
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew that he was facing a fixed 
term in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement. 
So instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two 
years in prison as a minimum. 
(3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.) The court then went on to find that the state would be 
prejudiced by allowing Crump to withdraw his plea of guilty: 
In this case, there was prejudice. There was prejudice to the state 
by the fact that they dismissed one of the counts with prejudice. It does 
appear from reviewing the transcript and being familiar with both of these 
cases that this was a package deal, the package deal being that in order 
for his wife to have her charge reduced to a possession charge and not be 
charged with a crime that would require a mandatory minimum, Mr. Crump 
would have to plead guilty. And that's what did happen. So the state has 
been prejudiced first by the dismissal with prejudice of Count II, and that in 
itself would be enough under these circumstances to deny the motion to 
withdraw the plea of guilty. 
In addition, the state was further prejudiced by the reduction of the 
plea - the charge in Mrs. Grump's case. 
(3/08/2012 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-22.) 
The district court sentenced Crump to a unified sentence of four years with the 
first two years fixed. (R., pp.168-171; 3/08/2012 Tr., p.69, Ls.4-7.) Crump filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.164-165.) 
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ISSUE 
Crump states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Grump's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea filed prior to sentencing? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Crump failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his pre-
sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
Crump Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His 
Pre-Sentencing Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Crump contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his pre-
sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) He alleges 
that prior to his guilty plea he did not understand "that he was facing a mandatory 
minimum sentence of two years by pleading guilty to attempted trafficking in 
methamphetamine." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) The record, however, supports the district 
court's determination that Crump failed to demonstrate a just reason entitling him to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Crump has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. 
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Standards Applicable To A Motion To Withdraw A Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after 
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sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when ruling 
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of sentence, 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 
P.3d at 780. See also State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 
(1990). Rather, "the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to 
withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted). 
Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the 
prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 
647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the 
defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the 
trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted). 
"The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine 
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). "If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then 
determine whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea." kl 
D. Crump Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His Motion 
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The district court, in denying Grump's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, found 
the following: 
I am familiar with the required standard on appeal examining this 
type of decision that an appeal from the denial of such a motion to allow 
the withdrawal of a guilty plea results in the burden being on the moving 
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party - in this case, Mr. Crump - to establish that there is a claimed abuse 
of discretion. 
I further recognize that in the proper exercise of discretion, the 
Court is required to identify the conflicting factors which should bear on 
the decision and must arrive at a resolution which is based on a well-
reasoned consideration of the factors that have been identified. 
So what do we have in this situation? We have Mr. Crump, who 
entered a plea of guilty in front of Judge Reinhardt. This issue presented 
initially - and I'll cover that - is, is there an agreement? Well, there is an 
agreement. It's a written - it's an agreement that appears to me to be 
written, but the agreement does appear to be ambiguous, at least in 
certain respects. 
If there is an ambiguity, which there appears to be, that ambiguity 
can be clarified by what I'm going to characterize as parts of the oral 
agreement. 
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a 
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew that he was facing a fixed 
term in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement. 
So instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two 
years in prison as a minimum. 
I could go ahead and simply state at this point that he did know 
what he was getting into when he entered the plea of guilty. But even if he 
did, in reviewing the law, even where a defendant -even if he had met his 
burden on a motion to withdraw the plea, the state may avoid withdrawal 
by demonstrating the existence of prejudice. 
(3/08/12 Tr., p.54, L.11 - p.56, L.2.) The district court correctly found Grump's guilty 
plea was constitutionally valid based upon his affirmative statements to the court that he 
understood the terms of the plea agreement and the maximum sentence the court could 
impose. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.) The district court further found Crump 
understood his rights when he entered his plea. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.20-22.) 
Crump asserts on appeal "that the district court's factual finding that he 
understood the consequences of his guilty plea was not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) The record in this case belies that 
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assertion. The pretrial settlement agreement containing the plea agreement pursuant to 
which Crump pied guilty included the language that the state would amend the charge 
of trafficking in methamphetamine, carrying a sentence of "5 fixed - Life," to trafficking 
in methamphetamine by attempted manufacture, carrying a sentence of "2 fixed - 15 
years." (R., p.103.) The document, signed by Crump, clearly states the statutory 
penalty for trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacture as "2 (fixed) - 15 
years/ $10,000 - $50,000." (Id.) 
At the change of plea hearing, Crump indicated he understood that the maximum 
sentence he could receive for pleading guilty to the amended charge was "a fixed two 
followed by an indeterminate 13. So, two to 15." (9/19/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.17-20.) At the 
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Crump conceded he understood prior 
to pleading guilty he would be serving a minimum of two years: 
Q [by attorney for the state]: Okay. And is it your testimony that she 
[your attorney] never told you that this was a mandatory minimum prison 
sentence case? 
A [Crump]: Um, can you repeat that again, please? 
Q: Are you telling us that she never once told you that you were 
looking at a mandatory minimum prison sentence? 
A; She said that I was not eligible for a Rider. That's what she told 
me. 
Q: Okay. What did she talk to you about the prison sentence? 
A: Nothing. 
Q: Okay. So she told you, though, you're not eligible for a Rider? 
Q: So if your attorney tells you you are not eligible for a retained 
jurisdiction, why is it you're here today saying that you thought you were? 
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A; Because when I looked at the plea agreement that I signed - that I 
was signing, that it didn't say that on there. 
Q: It didn't say what? 
A: That is was a mandatory minimum. 
Q: Okay. What does "two years fixed" mean to you, sir? 
MR. PHELPS [defense counsel]: Judge, could he have a copy of 
the agreement? 
THE COURT: Well, I want to hear him answer the question. 
THE DEFENDANT: Two years fixed? That means I would do two 
years. 
BY MR. GREENBANK [attorney for the state]: 
Q: Okay. No confusion. Right? 
A: Mm-hmm. 
Q: And when the Judge talked to you at your sentencing hearing or at 
your plea hearing, he covered that several times. Right? 
MR. PHELPS: 
speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: 
Your Honor, I'm going to object. The record 
I'll allow it. You can clear it up on redirect. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can you repeat it now? 
BY MR. GREENBANK: 
Q: At the time that you pied guilty to this offense -
A: Mm-hmm. 
Q: -- the Judge covered the fact that it was a fixed two several times, 
didn't he? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: You didn't express any confusion, did you? 
A: No. 
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(3/08/12 Tr., p.23, L.21 - p.26, L.3.) 
The district court correctly determined that Crump understood he "was facing two 
years in prison as a minimum." (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-19.) As such, Crump has 
failed to show the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
The court further found that "even if [Crump] had met his burden" on the motion 
to withdraw his plea, there was sufficient prejudice to the state to support a denial of the 
motion. (3/08/2012 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.24.) Crump states on appeal that he "is not 
arguing that there was just reason for the district court to withdraw his guilty plea," he 
just "did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea/ thus entitling him to 
withdraw it. (Appellant's brie( p.8, n.2.) Having failed to show he did not understand 
the potential penalties that could be imposed upon his guilty plea and having otherwise 
failed to show his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, Crump 
has failed to establish the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully 
conviction for trafficking by attempted 
/ 
to affirm Grump's judgment of 
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